“A recipe for thought”. •. •. Fred Dretske a sketch of a “naturalistic” account of intentional mental states (a “psychosemantics”). “Thought may be intentional. View Notes – dretske from PHIL at University Of Arizona. Fred Dretske A recipe for thought Phil/Psyc Fall How do you build a thinking thing?. A question about Dretske’s idea that intentionality can be located in things outside of the mind — such as compasses, thermometers, and even.
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Civil Society and its Discontents: This claim can be amended to original intentionality is sufficient for mentality, thereby making the claim have some chance thoufht validity Byrne n. Are intentional mental states simply physical states? Create a free website or blog revipe WordPress. Intentionality must also be plainly distinguished from intensionality because mental states are not intensional, only sentences are Byrne n.
Of course behavior is how we usually determine whether a system has intentionality, since it is what we can most easily observe, but internal changes thoughts also count, as mentioned above, and so it is possible that some completely immobile systems have intentionality, although we might never know it.
For Dretske Jacobinformation exhibits some degree of intentionality and is able to show both the intentionality of beliefs as well as its derived intentionality of an utterance that can misrepresent such information.
To remedy this we add the criterion that not only must P usually be caused by C but that P must cause the system to act including fro as if C. This is because intentionality, as presented here, is not a part of the mind, instead it is a way that we refipe describe or talk about the mind.
A Recipe for Homebaked Normativity. When I am thinking about gor that does not exist, it has no place in the physical world. With his assessment of intentional inexistence, Brentano Byrne n.
Classical and Contemporary Readings, D.
mental_content [Philosophy of Mind]
Email required Address never made public. The Nature of Thought. For example, the statement I am thinking about fire-breathing dragons simply means that my thoughts are directed toward such dragons, even though they do not physically exist.
However, intentional phenomena like the compass, although able to misrepresent the information it was designed to deliver, is reliant on us to be able to do it. You are commenting using your WordPress. For example, when I see a cat, I am perceptually thougt of that cat, or when I believe that it is going to rain, my belief represents a state of the weather. The philosopher Fred Dretske investigated the claims of the late philosopher Roderick Chisholm who argued that intentional states could only be mental states.
The criterion for this primitive intentionality is that a property, P, of a system is about some feature of the world, C, if and only if the presence of P is usually caused by C.
It is the derived power of such objects to misrepresent that Dretskep. We intuitively understand that there are many kinds of things that can be about other things, for example photographs are about their contents.
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A Recipe for Thought
You are commenting using your Twitter account. Most significantly we have thoughts about external objects that are about them, but these thoughts are not caused directly by those objects. Just as when investigating consciousness, problems arise when attempting to find some criterion for an intentional relation in a specific instant.
Recently I have been considering the idea that it is only possible to determine if a system is conscious by examining how the state of the system in a given instant is connected to previous and subsequent moments, as well as the properties of the system at that moment which are all some theories consider relevant for consciousness.
No keywords specified fix it. For Dretske to maintain that intentionality can be physically or naturalistically reduced he distinguishes between original or intrinsic intentionality and derived intensionality. Notify me of new comments via email. With the claim that intentionality is necessary for mentality it can be countered with the claim that sensations are mental states that are non-intentional Byrne n. A sentence can be intentional yet be completely separate from intentionality and also sentences that report mental states need not be intensional Byrne n.
Models for Relevant Modal Logics. Sign in to use this feature. He also contended that it is possible for two different states to be directed towards the same object and only psychological phenomena had this object directedness Chalmersp. March 26, at 3: Sign in Create an account.
Gordon Giles – – Philosophy Now Fernando Birman – – Disputatio 3 A feature of mental states is their content. Condit – – Journal of Medical Humanities 22 1: Intentionality — Peter To establish his theory that intentionality is already naturalized, Dretskyp. This entry has no external links.
You are commenting using your Facebook account. Leave a Reply Cancel reply Enter your comment here Categories 21st centuryconsumerism, Sigmund Freud, marketing, advertising, wish fulfilment, desiresphysical states. Chisholm accounts for the intentionality of thoughts through language, semantics, and mental expectation.